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Introduction
In the last few decades, scientists have discovered numerous astonishing
facts about our universe that seem to indicate it has been precisely fine-tuned for
life. As engineers who design our spaceships to sustain human lives in space can
attest, life can only exist if numerous factors are set to precise specifications.
Similarly, our universe seems to have been finely tuned for intelligent life to exist
and thrive. The fact that these laws of physics are set just so has led many to
conclude that our universe was designed by a supreme being with an intelligent
mind. Many use the term ‘God’ to refer to such a supreme being, as will I for the
remainder of this article.
Since I myself am not a scientist, I rely on professional academic scientists
to better understand these issues, scientists such as Stephen Barr. Having earned
his Ph.D. in physics from Princeton University in 1979, Barr went on to do highlevel research in theoretical particle physics and cosmology. He is a Fellow of the
American Physical Society and is currently Professor of Theoretical Particle
Physics at the Bartol Research Institute at the University of Delaware. Barr has
given several examples of such finely-tuned constants concerning our universe
that, when discovered, greatly impressed and surprised many scientists. For
example, scientists have
…discovered that indeed carbon does have an energy level at 7.66 MeV.
What if this energy level of carbon had been at a slightly different energy?
What if it had been 7.5 MeV or 7.9 MeV instead? In that case the threealpha process would not have been resonantly enhanced, very little carbon
would have been synthesized in stars, the building up of the elements
would have been stymied, and there would be very little ordinary matter in
the universe except hydrogen and helium.1
Barr used numerous examples of such fine-tuned constants as evidence to argue
that our universe was designed for life by a supreme being with an intelligent
mind.
Many theists and atheists agree that the fine-tuning argument is the most
compelling argument for the existence of God. However, there are many different
versions of this argument, and, as with most things in life, some versions are
better than others. In this paper, I will respond to Neil A. Manson’s recent critique
of what I call the “Bayesian Version of the Fine-Tuning Argument for God’s

1

Stephen M. Barr, Modern Physics and Ancient Faith (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
Notre Dame Press, 2003), 123.
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existence.”2 I will argue that the Bayesian version is a relatively poor argument
but that the “Abductive Version of the Fine-Tuning Argument for God’s
existence” is quite compelling.
The Bayesian Version of the Fine-Tuning Argument
In order to understand the Bayesian Version of the Fine-Tuning Argument, you
first need to understand Bayes’ Theorem. If you like math, then you will love this
section. If you do not like math, then I am sorry, but here we go anyway.
As I noted in the title of this paper, I am a former statistician. Technically,
I was an actuary, but many have never heard that term before. Actuaries
specialize in actuarial science, which is called a science but actually has more to
do with mathematics. Actuaries apply rigorous mathematical and statistical
methods to assess and price risk, mostly in insurance, finance, and investments.
Some actuaries work on Wall Street, some work for the government, but most
work for insurance companies to develop, price, and value insurance products. I
worked in the field of actuarial science for ten years, seven of which I spent
studying for the professional exams required to earn the coveted FSA (Fellow of
the Society of Actuaries) designation. During these seven years, I spent, on
average, three to four hours a day studying calculus, probability, statistics,
finance, and actuarial mathematics. During my actuarial career, I worked for
insurance companies such as Allstate and Humana, mostly pricing life insurance.
I have taken the time to explain this part of my background in order to make the
point that I am very familiar with both the strengths and weaknesses of Bayes’
Theorem.
Bayes’ Theorem is very well known as a tool in probability theory that
calculates conditional probabilities. In other words, it calculates the probability of
an event based on prior knowledge of conditions that might be related to that
event.3 It has been usefully applied in many different fields such as science,
engineering, psychology, etc. The theorem was named after Thomas Bayes (died
AD 1761), an English statistician, philosopher, and Presbyterian pastor, because
he formulated an important version of the theorem.
At this point, I will present a traditional example that’s often used to
explain Bayes’ Theorem. Suppose you have two bags of beans. In the first bag
there are 10 green beans and 90 red beans. In the second bag there is 1 green bean
2
Neil A. Manson, “How Not to Be Generous to Fine-Tuning Sceptics,” Religious Studies
56.3 (2020): 303–17. However, the page numbers that I reference in this paper refer to Manson’s
publicly available version which can be found at (PDF) How not to be generous to fine-tuning
sceptics | Neil A. Manson - Academia.edu
3
James Joyce, “Bayes’ Theorem,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/bayes-theorem/>.
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and 99 red beans. While your eyes are closed, your friend chooses one of the two
bags randomly and tells you to pick one bean out of the bag. When you open your
eyes, you see that you picked a green bean. Given the condition that you picked a
green bean, what is the probability that your friend picked the first bag? Bayes’
Theorem can be used to calculate this conditional probability as follows:
❖ Probability of your friend choosing the first bag = P(bag 1) = 50%
❖ Probability of your friend choosing the second bag = P(bag 2) = 50%
❖ Probability that you’d pick a green bean, given the condition that your
friend chose the first bag = P(green | bag 1) = 10/100 = 10% because there
are 10 green beans out of 100 in the first bag
❖ Probability that you’d pick a green bean, given the condition that your
friend chose the second bag = P(green | bag 2) = 1/100 = 1% because there
is only 1 green been out of 100 in the second bag
❖ Probability of your friend choosing the first bag and you choosing a green
bean = P(bag 1) x P(green | bag 1) = 50% x 10% = 5%
❖ Probability of your friend choosing the second bag and you choosing a
green bean = P(bag 2) x P(green | bag 2) = 50% x 1% = .5%
Bayes’ Theorem can calculate the probability that your friend chose the first bag,
given the condition that you picked a green bean, as follows: P(bag 1 | green) =
P(bag 1) x P(green | bag 1)
P(bag 1) x P(green | bag 1) + P(bag 2) x P(green | bag 2)
Which is calculated as:
5%
5% + .5%
Which comes to 91%. Conversely, you can calculate the probability that your
friend chose the second bag, given the condition that you chose a green bean, and
that comes to 9%. Thus, given the condition that you picked a green bean, it is
much more likely your friend chose the first bag. Of course, there is still a small
possibility (9%) that he chose the second bag, but it is much more probable (91%)
he chose the first bag, given the condition that you picked a green bean.
Even though it may be hard to imagine, given this silly bag-of-beans
example, Bayes’ Theorem has been usefully applied in many different fields.
Because of this, it is not surprising that some have tried to apply it in making their
case for the existence of God. Next, I will present an oversimplified example,
using the same inputs from my bag-of-beans example, of how some have tried to
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use Bayes’ Theorem to argue for God’s existence based on the fine-tuning of the
universe.
Suppose there are two possibilities. In the first possibility God does exist,
and there’s a 10% probability that this God, if He did exist, would create a finetuned universe that is life-permitting. We will call this 10% probability ‘PLUG’
(the Probability there would be a fine-tuned Life-permitting Universe, given the
condition that God does exist). In the second possibility God does not exist, and
there is a 1% probability that, if there was no God, a universe fine-tuned for life
could come about by chance. We will call this 1% probability ‘PLUN’ (the
Probability there would be a fine-tuned Life-permitting Universe, given the
condition that there is No God). Let’s say we have no other information to go on
about whether or not God exists (which is not the case but we’ll assume it is so to
simplify this example), so we’ll set the probability there’s a God at 50% and the
probability there is not a God also at 50%. Given that we find ourselves in a
universe fine-tuned for life, what is the probability that God exists? Bayes’
Theorem can be used to calculate this probability as follows:
❖ Probability of the existence of God = P(God) = 50%
❖ Probability that God does not exist = P(no God) = 50%
❖ Probability that there would be a universe fine-tuned for life, given the
condition that God does exist = P(fine-tuned universe | God) = 10/100 =
10% because there’s a 10% chance such a God, if He exists, would choose
to create a universe fine-tuned for life (remember we’re calling this
PLUG)
❖ Probability that there would be a universe fine-tuned for life, given the
condition that there is no God = P(fine-tuned universe | no God) = 1/100 =
1% because there’s only 1% chance that a fine-tuned universe would come
about by chance (remember we’re calling this PLUN)
❖ Probability of there being a God and that God chooses to create a universe
fine-tuned for life = P(God) x P(fine-tuned universe | God) = 50% x 10%
= 5%
❖ Probability of there being no God and there existing, by chance, a universe
fine-tuned for life = P(no God) x P(fine-tuned universe | no God) = 50% x
1% = .5%
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Bayes’ Theorem can calculate the probability that there is a God, given that we do
in fact have a universe fine-tuned for life, as follows: P(God | fine-tuned universe)
=
P(God) x P(fine-tuned universe | God)
P(God) x P(fine-tuned universe | God) + P(no God) x P(fine-tuned universe | no
God)
Which is calculated as:
5%
5% + .5%
Which comes to 91%. Conversely, you can calculate the probability that there is
no God, given that we live in a universe fine-tuned for life, and that comes to 9%.
According to this then, given the condition that we do have a fine-tuned universe,
it is much more likely God exists than He does not. Of course, there is still a small
possibility (9%) that there is no God, but it is much more probable (91%) that
there is. This is an oversimplified example of how some have used Bayes’
Theorem to argue that it is more probable God exists than that He does not, given
the condition that we do have a universe fine-tuned for life.
I used the exact same probability inputs here as I did for the bag-of-beans
example just so you could follow along more easily. As you can imagine, when
people use Bayes’ Theorem like this to argue for God’s existence, they use much
different probability inputs. For example, they often claim that the probability that
there would be a universe fine-tuned for life, given that God does exist, is much
higher than 10%. They argue that if God exists, He would be more likely than not
to create a universe fine-tuned for life. Remember that we are calling this
probability PLUG. In addition, they often claim, reasonably so in my estimation,
that the probability that there would be a universe fine-tuned for life if there is no
God, that such a universe arose merely by chance, is much lower than 1%.
Remember that we are calling this probability PLUN. These two changes to the
initial probability inputs of course would greatly increase the probability that God
does exist, given that we live in a universe fine-tuned for life.
Manson’s Critique of the Bayesian Version of the Fine-Tuning Argument
Manson noted that for a Bayesian Version of the Fine-Tuning Argument to work
“… it is not enough to argue that it is extraordinarily improbable that the universe
is life-permitting if God does not exist [PLUN]. One must also give reasons for
thinking that the probability that the universe is life-permitting if God exists
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[PLUG] is not likewise extraordinarily low.”4 Therefore, most Bayesian Versions
of the Fine-Tuning Argument “… include a premise to the effect that the
probability that the universe is life-permitting if God exists [PLUG] is not nearly
as low as the probability that the universe is life-permitting if God does not exist
[PLUN].”5 He explained that,
[r]ecently, however, some proponents of the fine-tuning argument have
indicated that there is no need for a positive argument that PLUG is not
extremely low. The universe’s being just right for life is so vastly
improbable if there is no God, they say, that the fine-tuning argument will
be compelling even if we set PLUG at one in a billion (or even lower). In
other words, even if one has real questions about whether God would
create anything at all and about what sort of world God would create, that
doubt can just be expressed as an extremely low personal probability of
0.000000001 that God would create a life-permitting universe. Even if that
is one’s credence, they say, the life-permittingness of the universe is
compelling evidence of God’s existence, because the probability that our
universe is life-permitting just by chance [PLUN] is vastly lower even
than one in a billion.6
In other words, particular Christian apologists have argued that even if PLUG is
very low, Bayes Theorem still calculates a high probability that God exists
because PLUN is extremely miniscule.
Manson chided Christian apologists for using this strategy as follows:
[S]uppose a Christian apologist is making the fine-tuning argument to an
audience of everyday people. She begins by offering a (hypothetical)
billion-to-one wager to audience members that God would create a lifepermitting physical universe if He existed [PLUG]. Doubtless a high
percentage of the audience will say that they would take the bet. They do
not want to say that it is impossible, and billion-to-one odds are close to
the lowest betting odds it is feasible even to propose. She then inserts ‘one
in a billion’ as the collective credence of the audience that God would
create a life-permitting universe. And she then proceeds to run the
[Bayesian Version of the] fine-tuning argument in the manner of Rota,
Hawthorne & Isaacs, and Barnes. Such an apologist would be quite a sly

Manson, “How Not to Be Generous to Fine-Tuning Sceptics,” 2.
Ibid.
6
Ibid., 3.
4
5
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person and would have a great future designing circus games. Proponents
of the fine-tuning argument should not act like her.7
While it is true that some popular-level Christian apologists act like circus
performers from time to time, I should probably leave that topic for another day.
For now I will only mention the often repeated, yet not so inaccurate,
generalization that Christian apologists tend to overstate their case for Christianity
whereas Christian philosophers tend to understate it. Sometimes overstating one’s
case, or being overly confident about one’s position, is part of an attempt to be
more persuasive, but I personally find such individuals less persuasive.
Manson’s concern about such popular-level apologetic strategies
highlights his primary criticism of the Bayesian Version of the Fine-Tuning
Argument, namely, that Bayes’ Theorem is only accurate, and thus useful, if we
are fairly confident about the initial probability inputs. Manson argues that
estimating the conditional probability inputs for this argument, PLUG and PLUN,
is like shooting in the dark. Critics of this argument, such as Manson himself,
maintain that “the value of PLUG is inscrutable. They claim to see no basis for
assigning any probability at all to the proposition that God would create a lifepermitting physical universe.”8 He also noted that such critics “claim to find it
inscrutable what sort of universe God would or would not want to create.”9 He
lamented that we “really have no idea what kind of universe God would create or
even whether God would create a universe at all.”10 Part of his reasoning for this
point is that “God is a being so unlike us that we simply cannot say what we
ought to expect God to do with regards to creation.”11 He concluded that “[e]ven
if both humans and God count as beings with minds, God’s mind is so different
from ours that we cannot judge what God would be likely to create, or even
whether God would be likely to create at all. So how can we say with any
confidence that God would create a life-permitting universe?”12 Thus, Manson
concludes that the Bayesian Fine-Tuning Argument is a poor argument.
My Response to Manson’s Critique of the Bayesian Version of the FineTuning Argument
I agree entirely with Manson that the degree of accuracy in the results of
Bayes’ Theorem in any particular application is directly proportional to the degree
Manson, “How Not to Be Generous to Fine-Tuning Sceptics,” 12.
Ibid., 5.
9
Ibid., 19.
10
Ibid., 18.
11
Ibid., 6.
12
Ibid., 6–7.
7
8
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that the initial probability inputs are accurate. If your initial probability inputs are
accurate, such as in the bag-of-beans scenario, then Bayes’ Theorem is an
accurate and useful tool. However, if it is difficult or impossible to establish your
initial probability inputs, then Bayes’ Theorem is practically worthless. With the
bag-of-beans scenario we knew how many bags there were and how many beans
of each color were in each bag. Imagine though that we did not know how many
bags there were that our friend could choose from and that we did not know how
many beans of each color were in each bag. In that scenario Bayes’ Theorem
would be of no use whatsoever. Yes, we could make some guesses as to the initial
probability inputs, but the result of using Bayes’ Theorem in such a scenario
would be no better than the initial guesses themselves.
I also agree with Manson that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for us
to come up with some sort of estimation concerning the probability that God, if
He exists, would create a life-sustaining universe. Thus, I affirm his concern
about the Bayesian Fine-Tuning Argument for God. Do not get me wrong; I am a
theist because I find several arguments for the existence of God, such as the
cosmological and teleological arguments, extremely compelling. But that does not
mean I think all arguments for God are compelling. For example, here is a terrible
argument for God’s existence:
1. God exists if Adam Lloyd Johnson drives a black vehicle.
2. Adam Lloyd Johnson drives a black vehicle.
3. Therefore, God exists.
Now of course I agree with the conclusion because of other, much better,
arguments, but this argument itself is not a very compelling way to argue for this
conclusion. I feel the same way about the Bayesian Fine-Tuning Argument, but
thankfully there are other versions of the fine-tuning argument.
The Abductive Version of the Fine-Tuning Argument
What I call the ‘Abductive Version of the Fine-Tuning Argument’ is as follows:
1. The universe is fine-tuned for life.
2. The best explanation for the universe’s fine-tuning is that it was
designed by a supreme being with an intelligent mind (God).
3. Therefore, God exists.
As with any argument, each premise needs to be explained and defended. Since I
did this for premise one in the introduction to this article, I will now briefly
explain and defend premise two.
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Premise two, that the best explanation for the universe’s fine-tuning is that
it was designed by a supreme being with an intelligent mind (God), is an
inference to the best explanation. David Baggett explained that:
An inquiry into the ‘best explanation’ invokes the process of abduction, a
common form of reasoning that distinguishes itself from deduction in a few
ways. Most importantly, whereas a deductive argument makes an effort at
forging an airtight evidential connection between premises and conclusion,
an abductive approach asks, less ambitiously, what the best explanation of
the relevant phenomena is. It typically uses criteria like explanatory scope
and power (along with plausibility, conformity with other beliefs, etc.) to
narrow down the explanation candidates to the best explanation, and
warrants, potentially anyway, to infer that the best explanation is likely the
true explanation.13
We often use this sort of abductive reasoning in our everyday lives as well as in
our scientific pursuits.
Here is a simple example of how abductive reasoning works. Let us say
you are a farmer, your crops have produced a harvest this year ten times greater
than you’ve ever seen, and you do not know why. Your friend Toni comes to you
and presents a possible explanation: the weather conditions this year (sun, rain,
wind, etc.) were just so perfect that they caused your crops to produce this
tremendous amount. Another friend, Lenny, approaches you with an alternative
explanation: a local scientist developed a new super-fertilizer and secretly put it
on your crops to test its effectiveness.
Of course, there are an infinite number of other possible explanations, but
most of them can be quickly rejected. For example, though it is possible that
aliens from another planet caused your harvest to be so plentiful, most would
reject this explanation unless there was substantial evidence to back it up. In the
majority of situations we face in life, a few plausible explanations quickly rise to
the top of the list that we then must evaluate more closely. In my farmer example
there are two such plausible explanations to consider. Which one best fits the
evidence? It will take some work on your part to fully explore both explanations
and see which one is most plausible and best fits the evidence. This is a simple
example of abductive reasoning, and it boils down to an inference to the best
explanation.

13
David Baggett, “Psychopathy and Supererogation,” in A Debate on God and Morality:
What Is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties? ed. Adam Lloyd Johnson (New
York: Routledge, 2021), 131. For an exhaustive treatment on this form of argument, see Peter
Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004).
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What leads many to conclude that the best explanation for the universe’s
fine tuning is that it was designed by a supreme being with an intelligent mind
(God)? This is based on an empirical observation, namely, that we have never
observed design come about from any other source than by an intelligent mind.
Think for a moment how archeologists detect design. Let us say an archeologist
digging at a site uncovers something that, at first glance, could either be an
ancient plate designed by a human or merely a flat rock which came about
naturally. There are two indications which would cause the archeologist to
conclude it was a designed artifact—complexity and specificity. Something has
complexity if it has multiple parts, and something has specificity if it has a nonrandom arrangement of these multiple parts.14 These two attributes together are
powerful evidence that something has been designed by an intelligent mind
because we have never observed specified complexity come about in any other
way. Scientists such as archeologists and forensic detectives both use these
principles to ascertain whether or not something was designed by an intelligent
mind. For example, if the archeologist discovered several sentences of a known
ancient language engraved on the back of the artifact, she would have no doubt it
was designed by an intelligent mind. She would immediately conclude this
because language is a classic example of specified complexity; it has multiple
parts (lines, shapes, or letters) which are arranged non-randomly to form words
and sentences.
An important part of the Abductive Fine-Tuning Argument is that God is
similar to us in the sense that He has an intelligent mind that can design things. In
fact, the Abductive Fine-Tuning Argument itself leads to this conclusion because
it is based on the empirical observation that we have only ever seen design come
about through the action of beings with intelligent minds, i.e., humans. Since
there is strong indication that the universe was fine-tuned, that is, designed for
life, it is reasonable to conclude that the being responsible for this design has an
intelligent mind analogous to ours.
Thus, I respectfully disagree with Manson concerning his suggestions that
“God is a being so unlike us”15 and that “God’s mind is so different from ours.”16
I do not know how Manson arrived at these conclusions because he, at least in this
paper of his I am considering, does not provide any reasons or evidence to back
up these assertions. The classical arguments for God (cosmological, teleological,
and moral arguments) seem to point to a God that is at least somewhat like us. For
example, since He causes things, we can reasonably conclude He is a causal agent
14
For a technical paper on how specified complexity can be quantified using probability,
see George D. Montanez, “A Unified Model of Complex Specified Information,” BIO-Complexity
2018.4 (2018): 1–26.
15
Manson, “How Not to Be Generous to Fine-Tuning Sceptics,” 6.
16
Ibid.
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somewhat similar to us; since He designs things, we can reasonably conclude He
has an intelligent mind somewhat similar to us; and since He is the source of
morality, we can reasonably conclude He is a moral being somewhat similar to us.
In addition, once a solid case is put forth that the Bible is from God, we
can take note of how the Bible describes the similarities between God and us. The
Bible seems to indicate that there are similarities between God and humans
because He created us in His image. The Bible often refers to this similarity, and
sometimes quite explicitly, as in 1 Cor 2:10–11 where Paul explained that the
spirit of a man is in the man, and knows the thoughts of the man, just like the
Spirit of God is in God and knows His thoughts. It is verses in the Bible like these
that have led most Christian theologians to affirm that there are attributes of God
which humans can also have, which often are referred to as communicable
attributes.
However, in order to avoid the danger of making God too human-like,
these similarities between God and humans should be understood analogously.
Concerning the verses from 1 Corinthians I mentioned above, Poythress wrote
that the “… text uses an analogy between the spirit of a human being and the
Spirit of God…. The expression ‘so also’ that begins the last sentence in 1
Corinthians 2:11 indicates that there is an analogy between a human person and
God.”17 Elsewhere Poythress warned against the danger on both sides of this issue
when he explained that if “… we treat the analogy like an identity, it is
univocism. We fall into non-Christian immanence, and we pretend that we can
bring God down to our level and capture perfectly the nature of God…. On the
other hand, if we treat the analogy as though God were completely different … in
every respect, we have equivocism. We fall into non-Christian transcendence,
according to which God is unknowable.”18 Certainly we do not want to think of
God as more human-like than He really is, but we should be careful, in protecting
against this error, that we do not go too far in the other direction and conclude
there are no similarities between God and the human beings He created in His
image.
Thus we can conclude that there are some similarities between God and
us, even if it is not possible to nail down exactly what all these similarities are. As
for why God would create beings similar to Himself, consider Torrance’s
comment that “… God does not will to exist for himself alone and does not wish
to be without us, but has in his eternal purpose of love freely created a universe,
within which he has placed human beings made after his own image and likeness

17

Vern S. Poythress, Knowing and the Trinity (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2018),

18

Poythress, Knowing and the Trinity, 104.

58.
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in order that he may share his love with them and enable them to enjoy his divine
fellowship.”19
In this section I have argued that the Abductive Fine-Tuning Argument is
a strong argument for the existence of God. In the next section I will put forth an
analogy to the fine-tuning argument which will illustrate why the Bayesian
version is not very useful and why the Abductive version is so compelling.
A Cabin in the Woods
Consider the following hypothetical situation: Chad purchased 120 acres of
woods so he could enjoy hiking, nature watching, and hunting in his spare time.
One of the reasons he purchased this particular section is that Travis, the one who
sold it to him, told him that this was a well-preserved natural habitat because no
humans had ever lived there or developed it in any way. This was important to
Chad because he knew any such human development would have scared off some
of the wildlife and because he wanted to enjoy nature that had been completely
undisturbed by humans. Unfortunately, within the first few weeks after he
purchased the 120 acres, Chad discovered a relatively modern log cabin in the
woods along with a large garden surrounded by a fence. He was quite upset with
Travis, who, when he sold it to him, claimed there was no such human
development in these woods. Chad decided to take Travis to court and plead his
case before a judge. Incredibly, in court Travis claimed he told the truth when he
said that there was no human development in these woods because the cabin came
about not through human design but through chance.
In order to make his case before the judge that a human had designed and
built this cabin, Chad presented a Bayesian Argument similar to the Bayesian
Fine-Tuning Argument for God. He claimed that if there was a human who had
been living in these woods, there is a decent probability that this human would
have built such a cabin. In other words, the probability there would be a cabin,
given the condition that a human had lived in these woods, was fairly large. He
argued that, even if this probability was not fairly large, the probability of such a
cabin coming about merely through chance, apart from human design, was
extremely small. In other words, the probability there would be a cabin, given the
condition a human was never in these woods, is miniscule. To keep it simple, let
us say he used the same probabilities that we did above with the bags-of-beans
example and concluded there was a 91% chance this cabin was designed and built
by a human.
To counter this argument, Travis, who sold the land, argued that it is
impossible to know the probability that a human, if they lived in these woods,
19
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would build a cabin or not. Yes, a human might build such a cabin, but they might
also decide not to build a cabin for a host of reasons. Even if they did choose to
build something, there are many other things they could have built besides a
cabin. For all these reasons Travis argued that the probability a human, if they
lived in these woods, would build a cabin was inscrutable. Travis concluded that
because Bayes’ Theorem is only useful when you have fairly accurate initial
probabilities to use as inputs, Chad’s argument that a human designed and built
this cabin was not very compelling.
When Chad began to respond to Travis’ argument and give more reasons
to believe the probability is relatively large that a human would build such a
cabin, given the condition that such a human had lived in these woods, the judge
quickly interrupted. He told them that they had gotten sidetracked from the issue
at hand by speculating about the probability that a human would or would not
build a cabin in these woods given there was a human who had lived there.
Instead, the judge put forth the following Abductive Argument similar to the
Abductive Fine-Tuning Argument for God.
1. There is a cabin in these woods.
2. The best explanation for this cabin is that it was designed and built by a
human.
3. Therefore, there was a human who had lived in these woods.
The judge noted that his second premise, that the best explanation for this cabin
was that it was designed and built by a human, is based on an empirical
observation, namely, that we have just never observed a cabin coming about in
any other way. Yes, there are other possible explanations for the existence of this
cabin, but the best explanation by far is that it was designed and built by a human.
The Abductive Version of this argument is superior to the Bayesian Version
because, given that we know a cabin does exist, all we have to do for the
Abductive Version is consider the best explanation for how it came about.
Whereas with the Bayesian Version, regardless of whether or not such a cabin
exists, we have to speculate about the probability that someone would build such
a cabin to begin with. Based on this reasoning, the judge sided in Chad’s favor.
The purpose of this hypothetical story was to draw out the superiority of
using an Abductive Fine-Tuning Argument for God instead of a Bayesian FineTuning Argument. While a Bayesian Version of the argument might at first seem
more sophisticated, in the end it is less compelling because it gets sidetracked by
having to needlessly speculate on the probability that God would, if He existed,
create a life-sustaining universe (PLUG).20
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Conclusion
There is overwhelming evidence that the universe is fine-tuned for life. What is
the best explanation for this fine-tuning? Since it includes specificity and
complexity, we can confidently conclude that it was designed. Considering the
empirical observation that we have only ever seen design come about as the result
of an intelligent mind, the best explanation is that it was designed by a supreme
being that has an intelligent mind somewhat analogous to ours. Because this
Abductive Version of the Fine-Tuning Argument is sufficiently compelling on its
own, it is not necessary to try and formulate a Bayesian Fine-Tuning Argument. It
may even be counterproductive to do so because it sidetracks the discussion down
a useless rabbit trail of having to speculate about the probability that God, if He
does exist, would choose to create a life-sustaining universe (PLUG).

majority of the universe is chaotic and not fine-tuned for life. This hypothetical story points out
that even though the vast majority of the 120 acres showed no evidence of human involvement,
the one small cabin alone is sufficient evidence to conclude that an intelligent mind was there who
had designed and built it.

